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Design of Dependable Systems on Android
by Patrick Holmberg Forsyth
In this thesis we analyze the concepts of dependability and dependable systems. We
investigate methods of designing and implementing dependable systems, in general, and
on the Android operating system. A literature review was carried out with two main
goals. Firstly, to gain and be able to spread knowledge of dependability according to both
its qualitative and quantitative definitions. Secondly, to prove our theory that there is a
lack of information regarding dependable systems on Android, establishing a need for this
thesis. We then attempt to apply our newly acquired knowledge in a case study, where we
design and implement a dependable system, in the form of a security camera application,
on Android. This gives further insight into the challenges of designing dependable
systems, and through our experience we learn how to overcome these challenges. While
the scope was too large to fully cover every aspect of dependability, we gained valuable
knowledge that is presented in this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Project description
1.1.1 Goal
The goal of this master’s thesis is to examine dependable systems, both in general and
specifically on the Android operating system. As a case-study a security camera ap-
plication for Android devices was developed. A security camera can be a component
in a critical system. It could, for example be used to monitor a dangerous process or
to detect intruders. Arguably, dependability is an important quality characteristic of a
security camera and its underlying software. Periods of downtime in a security camera
can, for instance, open up opportunities for potential intruders. What are the challenges
encountered when designing a critical and/or dependable system? Many critical systems
have specially designed hardware and run on platforms designed solely for performing
their task. What challenges will arise when running a critical system on multi-purpose
devices with other applications and services sharing the available resources? This mas-
ter’s thesis will attempt to answer these questions and it will contain useful information
for developers who strive to design and implement dependable applications for Android.
1.1.2 Target Audience
The target audience of this thesis is those who are interested in dependability and the
components of its quantitative definition: availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality,
integrity and maintainability. It should be especially of interest to those also interested
in the Android operating system. The thesis requires some knowledge of many fields of
computer science. To make the information more accessible we have tried to explain most
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of the theory in Chapter 2. To fully understand everything, it is however recommended
that you have prior knowledge of computer science.
1.1.3 Critical Systems
In this thesis, critical system is used to describe a system where failure will have dire
consequences, e.g. operational failure, injury of people, environmental damage, or loss
of life [1]. If failure in a system or a subsystem would result in failure of operations
as a whole, the system is deemed mission critical [2]. There are also business critical
systems where failure results in significant economic losses [3]. A third term is safety
critical where failure could result in loss of life, severe property damage or damage to
the environment [2]. An example of this is the cooling system of a nuclear reactor.
Without sufficient cooling, the reactor will suffer a meltdown, which means that the
cooling system is also mission critical. This shows that there is an overlap between the
terms, and a single system can fulfill the criteria of more than one of the definitions.
Critical systems require a high degree of dependability [4]. In this master thesis we aim
to examine the design of dependable systems, both in general and specifically on a mobile
operating system, Android. The focus will be on the software, in the case of Android, the
mobile application. The software is a component of a system, and if there is a fault in the
software of a critical system, this can propagate into the rest of the system, sometimes
with disastrous consequences [5]. An example of this is the Mars Climate Orbiter that
crashed into the surface of Mars in 1999 due to a software fault where one software
component produced results in imperial units and another component interpreted them
as metric units [6].
Another example of flawed design in a critical system is Therac-25, which was a radiation
therapy machine. Between June 1985 and January 1987 it was involved in six known
incidents, involving massive overdoses, with resultant deaths and serious injuries among
patients affected [7]. The patients were wrongly treated with a high-power beam of X-ray
photons, without a beam spreader plate rotated into place. Previous models (Therac-6,
Therac-20) had hardware interlocks in place to prevent this, but Therac-25 had removed
them and relied fully on software interlocks for safety. This software interlock could fail
due to a race condition in the software [5, 7].
1.1.4 Dependable Systems
A system is dependable if it can be depended upon to perform a particular task according
to its specifications. Reliance or trust in a system is only rational when its ability to act
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without producing certain failures has been evaluated. For a system to be dependable,
concrete evidence suggesting that such failures will not occur is required [8].
For a higher level of assurance, better evidence will be needed, leading to greater costs.
Therefore, the level of assurance should be chosen to match the risk at hand. For
instance, the failure of a nuclear power station or an air traffic control center cannot be
tolerated. Larger development and certification costs for such systems are accepted by
society. However, criticality depends on the context of use. As D. Jackson puts it in A
direct path to dependable software:
”A spreadsheet program becomes critical if it is used for calculating radio-
therapy doses” [8]
It is not possible to simply measure dependability on a numeric scale. Different failures
have different consequences and the cost of preventing every failure is prohibitive. This
means that a dependable system will most likely offer different levels of confidence for
different parts of its functionality [8].
1.1.5 Dependability of a System
Dependability can be used both as a qualitative and a quantitative term. In this paper
we will use the definitions made by Avizˇienis et al. (2004): The qualitative definition
is: ”the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted”. The quantitative
definition is a collective term, comprising availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality,
integrity and maintainability [9].
1.1.6 Introduction to the Android Operating System
In September of 2008 Google’s mobile operating system Android had its initial release.
It entered a smartphone market that was heavily dominated by Symbian OS with over
half of the market share (50.3%). As a strong second was Blackberry OS (20.9%), and
Apples iOS which had had a one year head start on Google had already claimed a
respectable share of the market (13.7%) [10].
In the fourth quarter of 2010 Google took over the top spot from Symbian. Since then
Android has had a meteoric rise, Symbian has been discontinued and Blackberry OS has
all but disappeared. At the time of writing this paper Android dominates the mobile
operating system market with an 84.7% share in the second quarter of 2014. Figure 1.1
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Figure 1.1: Smartphone mobile OS market share from Q2 2011 to Q2 2014.
Source: IDC
contains the market share for different mobile operating systems on shipped devices for
the last few years [11].
The popularity and open-source nature of the Android OS, coupled with with its mul-
titude of open API made us decide to design our case-study as an Android application.
Many of the planned features would be impossible, or at least more challenging, to
implement in, for instance, an iOS application.
1.2 Methodology
In this section we describe the work performed during the project.
1.2.1 Research Questions
In this thesis, these are the research questions that we aim to answer:
RQ1 What are the challenges when implementing an Android application with require-
ments on high dependability?
RQ2 What design patterns can aid in the design and development of dependable appli-
cations on the Android platform?
RQ3 What challenges arise when designing a dependable software system for a multi-
purpose operating system such as Android?
– What are the main differences compared to when designing a software system
running on specially designed hardware, tailored to its designated task?
– How does the difference in performance between different devices impact the
dependability of the running software?
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To answer these questions we decided to carry out a literature review, a case study and
finally a validation of our results.
1.2.2 Literature Review
A literature review on the topics of dependability, Android development and depend-
ability on the Android system was carried out. It was performed through electronic and
reference searching. For more details on the methodology of the literature review, refer
to Section 3.2. The literature review yielded valuable information sources regarding the
Android system and dependability. Further, it helped us verify our initial suspicions
regarding a lack of papers on dependability on the Android platform.
1.2.3 Case study – Security Camera
As a case-study a As a case-study a security camera application was developed. The
development was carried out in an iterative way. This enabled us to find threats to
dependability after each iteration, allowing us to search for means of ensuring high
dependability. security camera application was developed. The development was carried
out in an iterative way. This enabled us to find threats to dependability after each
iteration, allowing us to search for means of ensuring high dependability.
We incorporated the findings of the literature review in the design of the application.
The methodology of the case study is described in further detail in Section 4.2. The
case study also serves as a validation of the findings in the literature review.
1.2.4 Validation and Reflection
Finally, a reflection on all our experiences during the design and implementation of the
application, and the experiences we had while writing this paper, combined with prior
experience, will be used to discuss our findings.

Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Taxonomy of Systems and Dependability
In this chapter we will give necessary definitions and introduce important terms in the
fields of dependability and Android development. We begin with the definitions of
systems and dependability, these are fundamental terms used throughout this paper.
2.1.1 Definition of Systems
Throughout this paper the term system will be used to describe an entity that interact
with other entities. These entities include other systems, humans and the physical
world surrounding it; a collective term for these external entities is that they are the
environment of the system [9]. A system can be a hardware system, a software system
or a system containing a mixture of both.
A system is made up of components that interact with each other in order to solve a
certain task, or in general, provide a function. Each component of a system is in turn
another system which consists of one or more components. This recursion only stops
when the component can be described as atomic. An atomic system cannot have its
internal structure discerned or its internal structure is not of interest and can be ignored
[12].
The components make up the structure of the system. The structure generates the
system’s behaviour, which is what the system does in order to fulfill its function. The
behaviour of a system is defined as a sequence of states, where the total state consists of
the following states: computation, communication, stored information, interconnection
and physical condition [9].
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The service delivered by a system (a provider) is the behaviour as it is perceived by
the user. The user is another system, human or other, that receives service from the
provider via the service interface. The user can only perceive part of the systems total
state, its external state; the rest is the systems internal state [9].
Systems in the field of computing and communication can be characterized by four main
qualities: functionality, performance, dependability, and cost [12]. The functionality of
a system describes what a system is capable of doing. The performance of a system
describes how well it can perform these functions. The cost of a system tells us how
much it costs to buy or create, and also the running costs of maintaining the system [9].
The fourth quality, dependability, is the main concern of this thesis.
2.1.2 Defining Dependability
There exists many definitions of the dependability of a system or a system component,
and dependability can be used both as a qualitative and a quantitative term [12]. The
ISO definition is: ”The collective term used to describe the availability performance
and its influencing factors: reliability performance, maintainability performance and
maintenance support performance” [13]. The IEC defines dependability as: ”The extent
to which the system can be relied upon to perform exclusively and correctly the system
task(s) under defined operational and environmental conditions over a defined period of
time, or at a given instant of time” [14].
A discussion of the different views on the concept of dependability can be found in the
literature review (Chapter 5).
In this paper we will mainly follow the definitions made by Avizˇienis et al., the qualitative
definition is: ”the ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted” [12]. The
quantitative definition of dependability is a collective term that comprises the following
attributes: Availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity and maintainability
[12].
2.2 Attributes of Dependability
In this section we attempt to give an introduction to the attributes that constitute the
quantitative definition of dependability.
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2.2.1 Availability
The availability of a system tells us how large portion of the time that it is able to provide
correct service. In other words, the readiness for correct service [12]. IEEE specifies
availability as the degree to which a system or component is operational and accessible
when required to be used [15]. Availability is closely linked with the reliability and
maintainability of the system. To evaluate the availability of a system, risk assessment
can be performed, which is a method of analyzing the frequency and severity of possible
failures and the duration of their resulting outages.
2.2.2 Reliability
Reliability quantifies a system’s ability to remain in an available state. As Avizˇienis et al.
puts it, continuity of correct service [12]. A common measurement is the MTBF, Mean
Time Between Failure. Less reliable systems are generally less likely to be available than
more reliable systems. This is, however affected by how long the MTTR, or Mean Time
To Repair is [16]. If repairs are sufficiently fast, a system with a high rate of failures
can still have a high availability. One common way of improving the reliability of a
system is to add redundancy, by adding additional backup components that can be used
in case of failure in a component; another is to increase the reliability of the individual
components [17].
2.2.3 Safety
The attribute safety describes the systems capability of avoiding danger or loss to the
user or its environment. In case of failure the system should fail gracefully without catas-
trophic consequences. Safety-critical systems and devices, meaning that they have the
potential of causing harm to people, are becoming more and more prevalent in society
[18]. Traditionally the prevention of harm was assured by hardware safety functions and
mechanical protection, but in recent years, many systems also use software to imple-
ment safety functions. The software itself is immaterial and cannot cause direct harm.
However by affecting system state, it can indirectly cause harm [5]. Such was the case in
Therac-25, discussed in section 1.1.3. We have to co-exist with these potentially harmful
systems, and not only on the industry floor - modern cars for example rely heavily on
software [19]. In order to avoid harm, the existence of hazardous states must be discov-
ered and monitored carefully. There are several standards that address development of
safety-critical software, e.g. RTCA/DO-178B [20] and IEC61508 [21]. Similar standards
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for home-electronics and mobile phones are, for instance, the directives for CE-marking
products, i.e. Council Directive 93/68/EEC [22].
2.2.4 Confidentiality
Confidentiality, the absence of unauthorized disclosure of information [12]. For a system
to guarantee confidentiality it must take steps in ensuring the privacy of any information
it has access to; an unauthorized third party should not be able to gain access to it.
2.2.5 Integrity
Integrity describes the system’s absence of improper system alterations [12]. This en-
compasses both alterations to system state and system data. To maintain integrity the
system must provide protection against such alterations.
2.2.6 Maintainability
A system with high maintainability is easy to repair [23]. It is also easy to update the
system and expand it with additional functionality. In software engineering, maintain-
ability can also be used as a measure of the source code complexity and size [24, 25].
2.2.7 Security
Another combinatory term, security can also be applied to systems. A system is secure
if it simultaneously provides: availability only for authorized users, confidentiality and
integrity [12]. To analyze the security of a system there are standards such as Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (ISO/IEC Standard 15408)
[26].
Figure 2.1 shows how dependability and security are related to the listed attributes.
2.3 Threats to Dependability
When a system performs according to its function, it provides correct service. Deviation
from correct service is known as a system failure, which can be seen as a transition from
correct service to incorrect service. A period of incorrect service is a system outage. The
inverse transition from incorrect service to correct service is service restoration [12].
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Figure 2.1: Attributes of Dependability and Security
2.3.1 Relationship Between Faults, Errors and Failures
The part of the system state that is liable to lead to a failure is known as an error. The
adjudged cause of an error is a fault [27]. For example, a programmer can make a fault
when implementing a section of code. This is a dormant fault. Once the section of code
is executed, under certain conditions, the fault becomes active and produces an error.
When an error reaches the service interface and alters the service a failure occurs.
2.3.2 Classification of Faults
Faults can be classified in different ways. Figure 2.2 shows a tree representation of the
classes of faults described in Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure
Computing by Avizˇienis et al. [9]. A fault can occur during development (development
fault) or during system operation (operational fault). It can be an internal fault that
originates within the system boundary or an external fault that originates outside the
system boundary but propagates into the system through interference or by interaction
at the service interface. Further it can be a human-made fault or a natural fault. The
dimension of a fault can be a hardware fault that originates in, or affects, hardware;
otherwise it is a software fault that originates in, and affects, software [9].
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Figure 2.2: Classification of faults
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Faults can be either malicious or non-malicious. A malicious fault is a fault that is
introduced by a human with an intent to cause harm to the system. Faults can also
be classified by intent, either a deliberate fault which is the result of a harmful decision
or a non-deliberate fault introduced without awareness. Further the capability of the
developers are taken into consideration. If a fault is introduced as a lack of competence
by the developers or the developer organization it is an incompetence fault, otherwise it
is an accidental fault. Finally, the persistence of a fault can be used to classify it. A
permanent fault is assumed to be continuous while a transient fault is bounded in time
[9].
2.3.3 Failure Modes and Failure Severities
Systems can fail in multiple ways, known as its failure modes. These can be ranked
according to failure severities grading the consequences of the failures [9].
There are four viewpoints that characterize failure modes:
• The failure domain
• The controllability, or detectability, of failures
• The consistency of failures, when the system has two or more users
• The consequences of failures on the system environment
Figure 2.3 outlines the different types of failures modes that exists. Content failures
are failures where the information delivered at the service interface, the input, deviates
from what was needed to implement the system function. Timing failures are failures
where the time of arrival or the duration of the information is deviating from what was
needed to implement the system function. A further specialized case, where the external
state is constant (where system activity, if the system is still active, is not perceivable
by the user), is known as a halt failure. Erratic failures are failures where the service is
delivered, but in an erratic manner [12].
The detectability of failures addresses the signaling of service failures. If the transition
from correct to incorrect service is detected, and signaled to the user we have a signaled
failure. Otherwise we have an unsignaled failure. There is another type of failure asso-
ciated with the detecting mechanisms: If a loss of function is signaled when no failure
has occurred we have a false alarm [9].
With regards to the consistency of failures there are consistent failures and inconsistent
failures. If incorrect service is perceived in the same way by all users the failure is
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Figure 2.3: Outline of failure modes
consistent. In cases where some users perceive the incorrect service differently, or even
mistake it for correct service we have an inconsistent failure. Another commonly used
term for inconsistent failures is Byzantine failures [9, 28].
When discussing the consequences of a failure there are two aspects to consider. The
benefits provided by correct service contra the consequences of failures. A minor failure
is when the cost of harmful consequences of failure are of similar value to the benefits
of correct service. At the other end of the spectra are catastrophic failures, where the
cost of harmful consequences is incomparable with the benefit of correct service [9, 28].
2.3.4 Error propagation
Figure 2.4 shows the propagation of an error. It begins when either an internal dormant
fault is somehow activated, or an external fault reaches the component. A dormant fault
could be activated by a certain input to the component, an activation pattern. The prop-
agation within the component, the internal propagation, is caused by the computation
process causing the error to successively be transformed into other errors [9].
Once the errors have propagated to the service interface, it will affect components that
receive service from the component. In this example Component B receives service from
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Figure 2.4: Error Propagation
Component A, and when the error reaches the service interface A delivers incorrect
service to B, which results in an input error in Component B, subsequently resulting in
a failure of B.
2.4 Means of Attaining Dependability
There are different techniques available that can be used to attain dependability. Fault
prevention is used when attempting to prevent the introduction of faults during devel-
opment. Fault tolerance focuses on avoiding subsequent failures from existing faults.
Removing faults during system development and system use is known as fault removal.
Fault forecasting is a set of techniques used to estimate how many faults exist in a
system.
2.4.1 Fault Prevention
Fault prevention is a natural part of engineering, and an obvious aim during development
of both software and hardware [9]. For example, in software fault prevention can be
achieved through modularization [29] and information hiding [30]. For hardware there
are rigorous sets of design rules that can be used for fault prevention [9], and shielding
of sensitive components and hardening of material can be used to prevent physical faults
[27].
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2.4.2 Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance techniques are used to preserve the delivery of correct service, even when
there are active faults present in the system. This is generally achieved through error
detection followed by system recovery. Error detection triggers a signal or message in
the system. This can take place during service delivery, as concurrent error detection,
or as a check for latent errors and faults while service delivery is suspended, pre-emptive
error detection [27].
Once one or more errors (and possibly faults) have been detected a period of system
recovery ensues that attempts to transform the system to a state without detected errors
and faults. This is achieved through error handling and fault handling [9].
Error handling attempts to eliminate errors from the system state. It comes in three
forms, rollback, compensation and rollforward. Rollback is where the state transforma-
tion consists of returning to a saved state that the system had been in, prior to error
detection. Compensation uses some sort of redundancy in the system to enable error
elimination. Finally, rollforward transforms the system to a newly created state without
detected errors [27].
Ideally, in addition to handling the error, the system should also try to handle the
fault that caused it. If the fault is not handled there is a risk that the error will be
activated again. Fault handling consists of four steps: fault diagnosis, fault isolation,
system reconfiguration and system reinitialization. Fault diagnosis attempts to identify
and record the cause, location and type of an error. Fault isolation in turn performs
physical or logical exclusion of the component from which the fault originated. The
faulty component is then excluded from the service delivery of the system, making
the fault dormant. System reconfiguration replaces the faulty components with spare
components or reassigns tasks to non-failed components. Finally, system reinitialization
updates and records the new system configuration [27]. Fault handling is usually followed
by maintenance that removes the isolated faults. The differentiating factor of fault
handling compared to maintenance is that fault handling is handled internally by the
system itself, without need for any external agent [9].
2.4.3 Fault Removal
Fault removal is performed both during development of a system and during its operat-
ing lifetime. During development there are three phases of fault removal: verification,
diagnosis and correction. Verification is carried out by checking that the system ad-
heres to certain properties, the verification conditions. If it does not, diagnosis of the
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faults that resulted in unfulfilled verification conditions is carried out. After necessary
corrections have been carried out, the verification process is repeated to make sure no
new faults were introduced by the changes [27].
A special term, validation is used when checking the specification. Specification faults
can be uncovered during any stage of development, not only during the specification
phase itself. For instance it may be discovered that a function cannot be implemented
in a cost effective way [27].
During the operational life of a system, fault removal is known as corrective or preventive
maintenance. As implied by its name preventive maintenance attempts to uncover and
remove faults before they are able to cause errors during normal operation. Corrective
maintenance, on the other hand, is used to remove faults that have already produced
one or more reported errors [27]. The faults removed by corrective maintenance may
already have been isolated by using fault isolation as discussed in the previous section.
2.4.4 Fault Forecasting
There are two aspects of fault forecasting: qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative
evaluation aims to identify and classify the possible failure modes, ranking them based
on their severities. On the other hand Quantitative evaluation, also known as probabilistic
evaluation, is used to evaluate the system in terms of probabilities. The probability that
a system attribute is satisfied to a certain extent is calculated, and the attributes are
then viewed as measures [9, 27]. Common techniques used in fault forecasting are failure
mode and effect analysis for qualitative evaluation and Markov chains for quantitative
evaluation [9].
In order to obtain probabilistic estimates, an approach called modeling is used. Modeling
can be conducted to investigate both physical and development faults. Modeling uses
data on past events to estimate the probability of an event occurring again. Modeling
usually targets only non-malicious faults, but there has been some progress in the field
of investigating malicious faults through modeling [31, 32].
2.4.5 Decoupling
Decoupling is a method that can be used to achieve locality [8]. Locality is useful when
building software systems with high levels of dependability. If some critical property of
the application is not localized, i.e. decoupled, it is affected by the entire system. To
determine if such a critical property holds or not, the entire system must be examined.
However, if the critical property is decoupled, the rest of the system can be treated
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as non-critical [8]. A system component is decoupled from another if its behaviour is
unaffected by the behaviour of the other [8].
Decoupling is first addressed during requirements analysis. Functions and services are
designed in a self-contained and independent fashion. In the design phase functionality is
allocated to components in a way that minimized communication between components.
When cross-component communication is necessary, it is important to create interfaces
that to not expose the internals of a service to its clients [8].
2.5 Android Architecture
2.5.1 The Android System
Android runs on a Linux-based kernel. Figure 2.5 shows the different layers that make
up the Android System. The kernel architecture is heavily customized and features
additional components developed by Google that are not included in the Linux kernel
development cycle [33]. These include:
• Binder
Used for inter-process communication and remote method invocation.
• ashmem
Android shared memory: A shared memory allocator, similar to POSIX SHM, but
with better support for low-memory devices.
• pmem
Process memory allocator: Used to manage large (1-16+MB) physically contiguous
regions of memory shared between userspace and kernel drivers (such as gpu and
dsp)1.
• ION
ION is a a unified shared memory system introduced by Google to reduce main-
tenance costs for system vendors. In the last few years chip manufacturers have
moved towards using ION instead of their own shared memory systems.
• logger
The Android systems logging facility.
1pmem is chip manufacturer Qualcomm’s shared memory allocator, other manufacturers such as
Samsung and Nvidia used their own, similar, yet different, memory systems
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• wakelock
Wakelocks are used to keep the screen on, or the processor running while the screen
is turned off. They keep the device awake on a per-event basis until the wakelock
is released.
• OOM handler The OOM (Out-of-Memory) handler kills processes when available
memory becomes low. It decides what process to kill based on rules that can be
modified from user space. More about this in section 2.5.7.
Figure 2.5: Diagram outlining the Android architecture
2.5.2 Android Evolution
API Levels
Every release of the Android system gets an incremental version number, known as an
API level. The API levels of major releases are also associated with a letter derived
from an assorted collection of sweets.
It is up to the manufacturers to decide which devices are upgraded to new API levels.
Older devices may lack the performance to be upgraded, and also making new software
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for all devices would be time consuming for the manufacturers. This means there is a
fragmentation in the Android market, many users are still using devices with lower API
levels as shown in Figure 2.6.
Version Codename API Distribution
2.2 Froyo 8 0.6%
2.3.3 -2.3.7 Gingerbread 10 9.8%
4.0.3 -4.0.4 Ice Cream Sandwich 15 8.5%
4.1.x 16 22.8%
4.2.x 17 20.8%
4.3 18 7.3%
4.4 KitKat 19 30.2%
Jelly Bean
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of API levels, November 2014
Source: https://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html
New API levels introduce new functionality. They are backwards compatible, meaning
a device on a higher API level can run applications made for older API levels. How-
ever, there is a risk that some features are not working as intended so developers have
to keep this in mind when developing and maintaining applications. Developers can
decide what API level is required to run the application by declaring it in a file called
AndroidManifest.xml2.
Device performance
Along with the software, the hardware of smartphones has also evolved substantially.
The system was originally designed devices with significantly less memory and a much
slower CPU. Table 2.1 below shows the specification of the first phone running Android
compared with that of a 2014 flagship.
The CPUs in the latest smartphones have multiple cores that each run at more than
four times the speed of the single core in the CPU of a HTC Dream. Also, while memory
management is still important for developers, a larger memory means they have more
leeway.
2The AndroidManifest.xml file can also be used in other ways to increase dependability, see Sec-
tion 4.4.4
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Device Released CPU RAM GPU Display Storage
(Cores@MHz) (MB) (GFLOPS) (Resolution)
HTC Dream 2008 1@528 192 1.2 320x480 256MB
Sony Xperia Z3 2014 4@2500 3072 166.5 1080x1920 16GB or 32GB
Source: GSMArena
Table 2.1: Comparison between HTC Dream and Sony Xperia Z3
2.5.3 Dalvik VM
Introduction to Dalvik
Dalvik is a process virtual machine (VM) that is used in Android. It is used to execute
applications written for Android. In Android 5.0 ”Lollipop”, released in November 2014,
it was replaced by an alternative runtime, Android Runtime (ART). More on Android
Runtime (ART) in section 2.5.4
Dalvik was implemented with a focus on devices with slow processors and small memory.
As the performance of smartphones has significantly increased since the release of the
first Android phone, Dalvik has evolved to reflect this. Examples of this are the addition
of a ”Just-In-Time” (JIT) compiler in Android 2.2, and the move to an ”Ahead-Of-
Time” (AOT) compiler in Android 5.0 (ART, more about this in section 2.5.4). The
JIT compiler compiles the bytecode on the fly, while the application is running. Without
JIT or AOT, the application is allowed to launch only when all the bytecode is compiled
into the native instruction set of the system [34].
Dalvik Architecture
A major difference in the architecture of Dalvik VM is that it uses a register-based
architecture, while Java virtual machines use stack-based architectures [35]. Register-
based architectures require fewer - but generally more complex - instructions [36].
Applications are written in .java files, that are compiled into JVM bytecode, .class files.
The Dalvik compiler then recompiles the .class files into DVM bytecode, resulting in a
single .dex file that contains all the applications classes.
In short, the conversion to a register-based architecture combined with other features of
the Dalvik compiler, results in that applications in Dalvik bytecode require an average
of 47% less executed VM instructions than in Java bytecode (stack-based architecture).
However, the tradeoff is an average of 25% larger code size due to the more complex
instructions [37, 38].
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Further, the 50% reduction in the code size achieved through the use of shared constant
pools in Dalvik bytecode offsets the increased code size from having a register-based in-
struction set. This means there is still a net gain in memory usage with DVM, compared
to the JVM and the .class file format [38].
These design principles allow Android devices to run multiple instances of the VM
efficiently [39].
2.5.4 Android Runtime (ART)
Android Runtime (ART) was introduced as an experimental virtual machine with the
release of Android 4.4 ”KitKat”. In the release of Android 5.0 ”Lollipop” it is the
standard VM [34].
One major difference is that while Dalvik uses a JIT compiler3, ART uses an ”Ahead-
Of-Time” (AOT) compiler. The AOT compiler compiles the bytecode to native code
before execution rather than during execution. This removes the latency associated with
the JIT compiler [34].
2.5.5 Android Applications
Android applications are mainly written in Java4. The source code is compiled, and
then packed with any required data and resources, into an application package (with
the suffix .apk) by the Android SDK. Android-powered devices use the package file to
install the application on the device. Once installed on the device each application has
its own security sandbox and has to abide by the rules of the system:
• Every application is treated as a different user by the Linux system. The applica-
tion is assigned a unique Linux user ID by the system. The system protects the
files of an application by setting the permissions so that only applications with the
same user ID can access them.
• Each process has its own virtual machine, which means that the code of each
application runs in isolation from the other applications.
• By default, every application runs in its own Linux process, but it is possible for
multiple applications to share a user ID.
3The JIT-compiler was introduced with Android 2.2
4It is possible to use native C/C++ for parts of an application
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• A permission system is used to grant access to features such as the camera, GPS
and network. Further, without the correct permission, the application is restricted
from reading and writing user data. The permission system is designed so that, by
default, no application is able to perform operations that would adversely impact
the user, the operating system or other applications. Permissions are granted on
a user ID basis.
• The system starts the process when any of the applications components need to
be executed. The system then shuts down the process when it’s no longer needed
or in case the system must recover memory for other applications.
This sandboxing of applications is one of the principle security features of Android. In
Android, every Dalvik process is the child of a special process called zygote. Zygote
is a master Dalvik process that forks new processes whenever an application needs to
start. This fundamental design choice allows processes to use shared memory, which is
necessary in order to save memory [40]. This shared memory contains commonly used
dex files, e.g. core libraries [37]. When Zygote is started, it loads and initializes these
library classes and corresponding heap structures. Since these libraries are generally
read-only, they can safely be shared between multiple processes. The shared memory is
marked as ”copy-on-write”. This means that in case a process writes to it, it will write
to a copy instead, allowing memory sharing without applications interfering with each
other. In addition to the memory saving effects, the design of Zygote also speeds up the
startup of applications, since each new VM is spawned from Zygote and does not need
to initialize the shared libraries [41].
There are four fundamental components that compose Android applications: Activities,
Services, BroadcastReceivers and ContentProviders. Not all of these building blocks
are required for every application, and there can be multiples of each type in a single
application. They each have distinct functionality and different life-cycles. Together
they define the behaviour of the application.
Activities
An Android Activity is generally meant to be focused on one specific task. Most activities
interact with the user, taking input and displaying output, so the Activity class provides
a Window where the User interface (UI) can be placed. Most Activities are presented as
full screen windows, but they can also be floating on top of other activities. By default,
only one Activity can be visible and in focus at any given time.
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There is usually one main Activity that is the starting point in the application. But an
application can also contain separate functionality where the starting point depends on
the current need of the user. An example of this would be a combined camera and photo
gallery application. In this case it is natural (and possible) to provide two separate entry
points to the application [42].
By default the components of an application all run on the same thread, the applications
”main” thread. However, it is possible for developers to make different components run
in different processes and also to start additional threads for any process. Utilizing
threading is necessary when doing CPU intensive work and long running operations
(e.g. network access and database queries) in order to not block the UI from updating
[43].
Services
The main difference between a Service and an Activity in Android is that a Service is
not directly visible to the user and that there can be many Services running at the same
time. A Service can be used to perform long-running operations that do not require
interaction with the user. A Service can also be used to expose some of the functionality
of its application to other applications.
By default a Service will run on the applications main thread. In case the Service
performs CPU intensive work it should create a separate thread where it schedules its
work. An example where a Service can be used is in a music player, where it is not
desired that the playback ends when the user leaves the application to do some other
work [44].
BroadcastReceivers
A BroadcastReceiver is used to receive Intents (described below) that are sent by the
method sendBroadcast(). A broadcast intent can be seen by every BroadcastReceiver
that is registered for that type of intent. Broadcasts can be used for cross-process
communication, which raises security concerns. Broadcast intents could be wrongly
intercepted unless the developer takes care in naming the Intent action names. Since
the Intent namespace is global, to avoid conflict with other applications the action names
should be named in a namespace owned by the developer. Since broadcast intents are
broadcast system-wide, a malicious process could ”sniff for” and intercept them. To
avoid this developers can use broadcasts more securely by restricting who can receive
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them. For instance, a developer could restrict the broadcast so that is only broadcast
within a single application [45].
An example of a use of a BroadcastReceiver is in a messaging application. The developer
would have to register a receiver for when a text message is received on the device. The
intent from the text message broadcast is then examined, and the new text message
is added to the conversation with the message sender. A broadcast is received by all
receivers that are registered for that type of action5 [45], this means there can be several
messaging applications on the device that all work correctly.
Other examples of broadcasts are system events such as a new incoming call or the
screen turning on or off. Further, developers can create their own broadcasts tailored to
specific events within their applications.
ContentProviders
A ContentProvider is used to store and retrieve structured sets of data. The Content-
Provider provides an abstraction from the underlying data (e.g. a SQLite database).
Data can be shared between different applications in a secure way by using Content-
Providers and ContentResolvers. On the device there are ContentProviders for things
like contacts, images, video and audio. It is also possible to create a custom Content-
Provider for those and other content types [46].
Intents and ContentResolvers
Communication between the first three of these building blocks (Activities, Services
and BroadcastReceivers) is performed by way of Intents; For communication with a
ContentProvider a ContentResolver is used [47].
Intents can be used locally, to achieve tasks within an application. By using Intents, an
application can also launch activities and services of other applications on the device.
The sender of the Intent expresses a desire to do something, it has an intent, and the
sender wants to achieve this in a certain way. One of the most significant uses of intents
is launching of activities. The intent can be thought of as the glue between activities.
It is a passive data structure, which holds an abstract description of an action to be
performed. When an intent is broadcast using the method sendBroadcast() it can be
seen by BroadcastReceivers which are registered for that type of intent[47].
5Unless Ordered broadcasts are used, these can be aborted by a receiver, meaning no other Broad-
castReceiver will see them.
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ContentResolvers work together with ContentProviders to ensure secure access to the
data of the application, and other applications on the system. The ContentResolver
accepts requests from clients, and resolves these requests by directing them to the Con-
tentProvider [46, 48].
2.5.6 Android Activity Lifecycle
The operating systems in the mobile devices of today are expected to run many processes
in parallel with limited resources available. A user might for instance be simultaneously
listening to music, browsing the Internet and downloading a large file. To cope with this
a lifecycle for processes is required.
For Activities there are three main states: resumed, paused and stopped. There are
several transitions between these states. Figure 2.7 is a diagram that shows the states
and transitions in the activity lifecycle.
When there is not enough memory available the system attempts to free up resources
by finishing processes that it deems are of least importance.
2.5.7 Android Service Lifecycle
An Android Service can be either a started service or a bound service. A started service
is created by another component calling startService(). It exists indefinitely6 and stops
only when it call stopSelf() or another component calls stopService(), once stopped the
system destroys the service [49].
A bounded service on the other hand is started by a call bindService(). Multiple com-
ponents can bind to the same bounded service, and communicate with it through the
IBinder interface. Once all bounded service have called unbindService() the system de-
stroys the service. Figure 2.8 shows the states and transitions of started and bounded
services [44, 49].
Even though services are for long-running tasks that do not explicitly require user inter-
action, they can be run in the foreground. To be a candidate for a foreground service, a
service should do something the user is actively aware of, such as an active music player.
A foreground service requires an ongoing notification to further remind the user that it
is currently running [49]. A foreground service is not a candidate for the system to kill
when running low on memory [44].
6Unless it is killed by the system to free up resources
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Figure 2.7: The states and transitions of the Activity Lifecycle
A service that does not need to handle multiple requests simultaneously can safely be
implemented using the IntentService class instead of extending the Service class. Among
other things, IntentService automatically creates a worker thread and provides default
implementations of other methods, making it easier than extending the ”full” Service
class [49].
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Figure 2.8: The states and transitions of the Service Lifecycle
Chapter 3
Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will present the state of art research in the fields of dependability,
including its main attributes: availability, reliability, safety, confidentiality, integrity and
maintainability. One of the reason for performing this literature review was to acquire
knowledge about dependability. The papers we found were used to aid the writing of
the previous chapter.
We will also present some literature on Android development. It is a quite young field,
but given Androids widespread use, there are already plenty of papers and resources on
the subject matter.
This literature review was partly motivated as a way of finding out if there were any
noteworthy papers on dependability on the Android platform. As we expected there
was a distinct lack of such resources. This is presented in the final part of the chapter.
3.2 Method
The articles and books presented will be chosen as a purposive sample, examining the
central and pivotal articles in the respective fields.
The search procedures used to find relevant articles are electronic and reference search-
ing. Electronic searching has been performed in databases such as IEEE Xplore and
Google Scholar. This has been complemented by examining relevant references in the
found articles.
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For dependability and its attributes, the search strategy used was to identify articles
with ”dependability”, ”availability”, ”reliability, ”safety”, ”security”, ”faults”, ”errors”,
”failures”, ”fault prevention”, fault tolerance”, ”fault removal” and ”fault forecasting”
in titles, in abstract or as keywords. This was matched with ”computer science” or
”software” to exclude the bulk of literature on mechanical applications and such.
By looking at the abstracts, aided by the amount of citations, we were able to extract
what we consider central and pivotal articles of the field. More widely cited papers, with
regards to their age, were indications of papers to investigate further. By then reading
the abstracts and skimming the articles, we could find out whether they were actually
of worth to our research.
For resources on Android development we identified articles with ”android” and ”de-
velopment”, and also a combination of ”android” with any of the terms: ”availability”,
”reliability”, ”dependability” or ”security”.
This study is motivated by a perceived lack of information regarding dependability on
the Android system. We feel there is a need for such resources.
3.3 Results
Below follows the results of the literature review, divided into subsections for the three
different research fields.
3.3.1 Dependability and Its Attributes
Since the early days of computational and communicative services, the need for correct-
ness has been of great concern. The July 1834 issue of the Edinburgh Review featured
an article by D. Lardner, in which he wrote:
“The most certain and effectual check upon errors which arise in the process
of computation, is to cause the same computations to be made by separate
and independent computers; and this check is rendered still more decisive if
they make their computations by different methods” [50]
It is noteworthy that ”...separate and independent computers...” in the quote above
refers to people performing computations and not machines.
During the dawn of the electronic computers, in the late 1940’s to mid-50’s, computers
were plagued by unreliable components. To relieve the issue, practical techniques such
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as error control codes, comparison through duplexing and triplication (triple modular
redundancy) were introduced. Further, there was a need for fast and reliable diagnostics
to find failed components. At the same time J. von Nuemann [51], E. F. Moore and
C. E. Shannon [52] introduced theories of redundancy - increasing reliability through
presence of multiple redundant components. These theories were unified by the intro-
duction of the concept of failure tolerance by W.H Pierce in 1965 [53].
In 1967, A. Avizˇienis combined the concepts of redundancy masking with the practical
techniques of error detection, fault diagnosis and recovery, coining the concept of fault-
tolerant systems [54]. Work on software fault tolerance was initiated by W.R. Elmendorf
in 1972 [55], later his research was complemented by work on recovery blocks by B.
Randell [56].
In 1970, the IEEE sponsored, International Symposium on Fault-Tolerant Computing
(FTCS) was founded. Another group, IFIP WG 10.4 Dependable Computing and Fault
Tolerance was founded in 1980. Research performed by these working groups lead to,
among other publications, J.-C. Laprie’s ”Dependable computing and fault tolerance:
concepts and terminology” [57]. In 1992 this was updated and expanded with the pub-
lication of ”Dependability: Basic Concepts and Terminology” [58]. During the 1980’s
there was significant research in the field of security threats, resulting in publications
such as Fray et al. (1986) [59] Dobson & Randell (1986) [60] and Joseph & Avizˇienis
(1988) [61].
The inaugural Dependable Computing for Critical Applications (DCCA) Working con-
ference was held in 1989, sponsored by IFIP WG 10.4. This and future DDCA con-
ferences allowed for interaction between experts from the fields of dependability and
security, advancing the integration of security into the framework of dependable com-
puting. In 2000, the DCCA and FTCS working groups were integrated into the DSN
(International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks). DSN holds annual
conferences presenting research results, problem solutions and insights in the field of
dependable computing and security.
In 2004 A. Avizˇienis, J.-C. Laprie, B. Randell and C. Landwehr published ”Basic Con-
cepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing”, a successor to their pre-
vious works, which further classifications, in particular of dependability threats and its
attributes [9].
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3.3.2 Android
Despite its youth, there is much printed material about Android development and An-
droids internals available. A few fairly recent titles that are well reviewed are: E. Hell-
man’s ”Android Programming: Pushing the Limits”, G. Nudelmans ”Android Design
Patterns: Interaction Design Solutions for Developers” and ”Android Programming:
The Big Nerd Ranch Guide” from Big Nerd Ranch guides [62–64]. As most publications
regarding mobile platforms, they become outdated quickly due to the swift development
of the platform. However, details regarding the system internals and design patterns
stay relevant longer.
For the latest official information we have used Google’s own website, Android Devel-
opers [65]. It is able to provide fresher information than any printed source could.
3.3.3 Dependability on the Android System
There is a distinct lack of resources regarding dependability on the Android system.
One paper by M. Cinque proposes utilizing Androids extensive logging facilities to assess
dependability at runtime [66]. The preliminary results of a specialized logging platform
for dependability analysis were promising. A case study by A. K. Maji from 2010,
presents a failure data analysis for mobile phones running Android and Symbian OS
[67].
Expanding our search, to include papers on Java and dependability, yielded a few more
papers. One by S. Orlando on dependability benchmarking on the JVM [68], and another
by G. Jacques-Silva on a fault injector for dependability evaluation of Java-based network
applications [69].
3.4 Discussion
In this section we will discuss the findings of the literature review. As in the result
section, the discussion is divided into three separate parts.
3.4.1 Dependability and Its Attributes
While writing this literature review, through electronic and reference searching, we have
come to the conclusion that a pivotal article on dependability is ”Basic Concepts and
Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Computing” (Avizˇienis et al. 2004) [9]. It is
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widely cited and its authors have extensive experience of the field. This article, and
preceding work by the authors [27, 57, 58], have laid the foundation to the taxonomy of
dependability used in this paper. It has also majorly influence on the viewpoints used
when we have analyzed dependability on Android.
3.4.2 Android
Arguably, the best way to find the latest information about the Android system is to get
it straight from the source, through the Android Developers webpage. There are plenty
of guides, best practices and coding examples, covering all parts of the system.
As a printed source we found ”Android Programming: The Big Nerd Ranch Guide” to
be a valuable resource [64]. But as with most printed sources on the topic, it is prone
to becoming outdated as the Android system evolves.
3.4.3 Dependability on the Android System
There were no resources on developing for dependability on Android. The papers pre-
sented in Section 3.3.3 could be useful for analysis of dependability, but not during the
design phase of a system.

Chapter 4
Case Study - Security Camera
4.1 Introduction
We decided to create a security camera Android application as a case study. While
designing and implementing the application we could evaluate the correctness and use-
fulness of the information found during the literary studies. Furthermore, we were able
to find out more regarding dependability on Android during the design and development.
4.1.1 The Application
The idea was to implement a security camera application on a mobile phone running
Android, which uses the phone’s camera. It should be designed with high requirements
of dependability. The application should enable old Android devices to be re-used as
security cameras.
The premise for the system was to upload images every second and also encode the
captured images into one hour segments which are then uploaded as a replacement to
the corresponding images. A video with little motion should compress well and take up
much less storage than the individual images did. Reusing existing video codecs and
cloud services (such as Dropbox and Google Drive) should allow more time to be spent
on research rather than on implementation. The recorded footage should be possible to
view through a Web UI.
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4.1.2 Reason for Choosing a Security Camera
A security camera can be a component in a critical system. It could for example be
used to monitor a dangerous process or to detect intruders. Dependability is therefore
an important quality characteristic of a security camera and its underlying software.
The base application - a simple camera which stores recorded footage locally - could
be expanded with additional features and functionality such as: compression, cloud
storage, basic motion detection, and a Web UI. This would increase the complexity and
the challenge of maintaining dependability with it. We would move towards a larger
system with many components working in parallel and in collaboration with each other.
The additional features are introduced to increase dependability. As the complexity of
the application increases providing dependability becomes more challenging.
Potential intruders who notice the security camera would probably try to destroy it, or
since it’s most likely not attached as firmly as a conventional security camera simply
take it with them. To counter this, we use the cameras network capabilities to connect
it to the cloud. By uploading the footage to the cloud it can be viewed remotely, and
the footage is preserved in case the camera is destroyed or stolen.
However, this introduces new challenges. How can we guarantee the availability of
the network connection? If the device is destroyed, how recent will the last recorded
frames be? If the perpetrator is quick enough in disabling the camera they may remain
undetected if the last frames never get uploaded. This and many other similar challenges
make the security camera a good candidate for a case study.
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Design Patterns and Principles
By starting with a bare-bones - perhaps somewhat na¨ıve - implementation we could
analyze the dependability to find flaws and how to correct them. When the current
features were deemed to be working well, more features could be added. This would
most likely introduce new dependability issues. By working in short iterations we would
hopefully be able to find many different dependability issues and how to correct them.
Due to the constraints of the project, the development process was limited to 15 weeks
of part-time work, with only one developer. We used a form of Rapid Application
Development (RAD), with less emphasis on planning and more emphasis on development
[70]. In RAD knowledge acquired during the development process itself is fed back to
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the requirements and to the design of the solution [70, 71]. The application is grown,
rather than built [71].
We also wanted to incorporate rigorous testing methods. Test-driven development can
significantly reduce defect rates, and it does not necessarily have to impact development
productivity [72].
We wanted to maximize decoupling in areas where it would be beneficial. Further
described in Section 2.4.5, decoupling is key to achieving locality. Components are
decoupled if the behaviour of one is unaffected by the behaviour of the other. Decoupling
should help minimize the risk of errors propagating through the system as described in
Section 2.3.4 [8].
Because there was a significant time constraint on the development process we decided
to utilize good open-source API to achieve application functionality when possible. This
goes hand-in hand with the RAD philosophy of getting as much functionality in place
as quickly as possible [71].
4.3 Result and Discussion - Development
This section contains a chronological description of the iterations of development. For
every iteration we describe what functionality had been implemented and what issues
and concerns had been raised during implementation. Where applicable proposed solu-
tions to these issues have been added.
4.3.1 System Architecture
Figure 4.1 shows the context of the system. The system consists of the application
and the underlying operating system. The application is controlled through the Cam-
eraActivity which is the visible part of the application, serving as the service interface
between the user and the system. The CameraService is running in the background. It
is responsible for both recording the scene and handling the logic behind uploading the
recorded footage to the cloud service. The system is able to utilize both mobile data
and Wi-Fi to transmit the footage to the cloud service. A client in form of a PC or
another mobile device can retrieve and view the footage remotely.
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Figure 4.1: State diagram showing the encoding flow
4.3.2 Planned Specifications
Below follows the initially planned specifications of the system and underlying applica-
tion:
1. Take one photo every second and upload to a connected cloud service.
2. Simultaneously, encodes the frames together into a video file.
3. Once the video file contains one hour of video, upload it to a connected cloud
service.
4. Once video upload is completed, delete the corresponding photos to save storage
space.
5. The application must be able to run when the screen is turned off.
6. The application must be able to run when the device remains unused for long
periods of time.
7. The application must keep track of what files have been successfully uploaded to
cloud service, and keep files in internal storage if there is network connectivity
issues.
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Figure 4.2 depicts a state diagram of the encoding flow. Until the file uploads are
completed the files are intermittently stored on the internal memory of the device.
Figure 4.2: State diagram showing the encoding flow
4.3.3 Iteration I - Base application
Iteration I Specifications
After the first iteration, the system specifications were as follows:
1 The application captures photos every second, storing them locally.
2 No video encoding functionality.
3 No cloud functionality.
4 The application is able to stay alive for extended periods of time,
and perform its operations when the display is turned off.
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To begin with, we had to decide on camera and file properties such as how to handle
camera focus, and what frame rate, resolution and bitrate to use. The steps we took to
decide on the initial parameters are discussed in Section 4.5.5. In agreement with RAD
we decided on what we considered probable values, while noting that the ideal values
and requirements may change in future iterations.
In the first iteration we did not implement any cloud functionality, opting for local
storage instead. There is no video encoding functionality, for now only the images are
saved. Coupled with the lack of cloud uploading support, this means storage capacity
is a concern.
The application was able to run and capture photos when the screen of the device was
turned off, and it was able to do this for extended periods of time as well. Three overnight
tests were carried out, and after all three tests the application was still alive, however
the internal storage of the device had become full. At this point, this resulted only in
warnings in LogCat (Androids logging utility). In future iterations it is important that
the user will be notified if device storage is running low.
Issues and concerns after Iteration I
1. Video encoding
We ran into trouble when starting the implementation of the video encoding. We
realized that it would be inefficient to use the current frame capturing solution.
In the first iteration, photos were captured every second using Androids hardware
Camera API. Encoding these into an mp4 video file would require several buffer-
to-buffer translations for each frame.
Proposed solution
It would instead be more efficient to render the Camera.Preview, a continuous
representation of what the sensor is capturing, to an OpenGL SurfaceTexture.
The SurfaceTexture could then be connected to a MediaMuxer, allowing a frame
every second to be encoded to a video stream. Each frame would also be exported
as a JPEG image file which could then be uploaded to a cloud service.
2. Cloud functionality
At this stage there was no cloud connection implemented at all. Instead the cap-
tured image was only stored locally. This severely limited the usefulness of the
application. The captured images would have to be manually retrieved from the
device, crippling the usability of the application. There are also security implica-
tions, a potential intruder could destroy or steal the device, making it difficult, or
impossible, for the owner to watch the footage. Another concern is device storage,
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which is limited and may run out when running for extended periods of time.
Proposed solution
For future iterations, look into the available APIs for Google Drive. We decided
to focus on support for Google Drive first, rather than Dropbox. This decision
was motivated by our initial suspicion that working with the Drive APIs would be
easier than the Dropbox API.
4.3.4 Iteration II - Transition to OpenGL ES
Iteration II Specifications
In the second iteration, the system specifications are as follows:
1 The application uses Camera.Preview rendered to an OpenGL surface.
2 Captured footage is exported as photos and, in parallel, is encoded to video files.
3 No cloud functionality implemented as of yet.
4 The application is able to stay alive for extended periods of time,
and perform its operations when the display is turned off.
The footage is now exported both as photos and encoded to video files. Table 4.1 shows
the size difference between exported photos and the corresponding video file.
Media Resolution Total Size
Video (3600 Frames) 1280x720 71.2MB
3600 photos 1280x720 186.8MB
Compression Ratio 2.62:1
Table 4.1: Size comparison between photos and corresponding video
OpenGL ES (Open Graphics Library for Embedded Systems) is a graphics library de-
signed for embedded systems. Since Android 4.3 (API Level 18) OpenGL ES 3.0 is
supported. For backwards compatibility we decided to use OpenGL ES 2.0 which is
supported since Android 2.2 (API level 8). Both versions allow for high performance 2D
and 3D graphics.
4.3.5 Iteration III - Cloud integration
Iteration III Specifications
In the third iteration, the system specifications are as follows:
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1 The application uses Camera.Preview rendered to an OpenGL surface.
2 Captured footage is exported as photos and in parallel is encoded to video files.
3 The photos are uploaded to a connected Google Drive account.
4 If there is no network connection, the files are stored on the
internal memory of the device, until a working connection is established.
5 Footage is only deleted from the local storage once it has been uploaded.
6 The user is able to choose whether to upload when connected through both
mobile network or Wi-Fi, or only when connected through Wi-Fi.
7 The application is able to stay alive for extended periods of time,
and perform its operations when the display is turned off.
In this iteration we introduced cloud connection. This is a central part of the application
that allows the footage to be viewed remotely. We decided to only add support for Google
Drive. Allowing for use of Dropbox and other cloud services should be similar, with
regards to implementation, and should also introduce the same or similar dependability
concerns.
We had to look into different strategies for storing the data until uploading was com-
pleted. This is discussed in Section 4.5.2. There were also concerns regarding the
integrity and confidentiality of the transferred data. This is discussed in Section 4.5.4.
When adding the cloud functionality we decided to go for a decoupled approach. We
used separate threads for capturing footage, for uploading it to the cloud service and
for monitoring the queued uploads, in periods with limited, or no, network connection.
In case something went wrong in one thread it would not directly affect the others.
Mechanisms were put in place to recover into a known and correct state in case of
problems with one component were detected, as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
4.3.6 Future Iterations
For future iterations, we would have liked to implement the remote control functionality
of the application. The application could use a web server to accept commands for such
things as pausing/resuming the recording and setting the focus and quality settings.
It could also report its status such as the device’s battery level, storage availability
and whether or not the charging was working correctly. If we had the time, we would
also have liked to implement image analysis features such as face detection and motion
detection.
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4.4 Result and Discussion - Android and Dependability
This section contains a summary of what we learned about dependability on the Android
system.
4.4.1 Android Security
A selection of security features built into the Android operating system are:
• Application sandboxing
Described in section 2.5.5, the sandboxing of applications isolates the data and
code execution of each application from other applications.
• Framework security
The Android framework contains robust implementations of common security fea-
tures. These include cryptography, permissions and secure IPC (Interprocess Com-
munication) [73].
• Memory management error mitigation
Security techniques such as ASLR, NX, ProPolice, safe iop, OpenBSD dlmalloc,
OpenBSD calloc, and Linux mmap min addr help mitigate risk of memory man-
agement errors [73].
• Permission system
Application-defined permissions are used to control application data and User-
granted permissions are used to protect user data and restrict access to system
features [73].
4.4.2 Risks - Permissions
The permission system is not fool proof. Many applications declare several permissions,
some even wrongly declare permissions they do not need [74]. The user is notified about
the permissions an application will receive during installation. If a user does not want
to grant the permissions he or she can decide to cancel the installation. A study by
Felt et. al performed in 2011 found that out of 940 tested applications, about one third
ask for unnecessary permissions [74]. The amount of requested permissions and the fact
that a user can not deny or permit individual permissions may lead to users installing
applications with dangerous permissions. Dangerous permissions include those that are
related to spending money or gathering sensitive information [74, 75]. For instance, a
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study by Enck et. al performed in 2011 found that out of 1100 tested applications 216
accessed the IMEI number of the device1. This sensitive information was misused to
track individual users or as a device fingerprint. Further, most of the tested applications
also had permission to access the Internet and unique phone identifiers were found to be
leaked through plaintext requests [35]. Another possible exploit of permissions would be
to use the telephony permission to make premium rate voice calls or for premium rate
SMS. However, Enck et. al found no cases of this behavior in their research [35].
4.4.3 Risks - System Attack
The system could suffer both physical and non-physical attacks. In the case of a security
camera application, if a perpetrator should try to take the phone with them, the system
could attempt to detect this using the device’s accelerometers. Regarding the robustness
of the device it could be argued that it would be easier to physically disable a smartphone
than a purpose built security camera. If were to be placed outdoors it would need some
extra strengthening to increase its durability.
When it comes to software security the design choices in the operating system ensures
that a vulnerability in an application cannot affect other applications on the system [76].
This gives Android applications good protection from external, deliberate and malicious
faults described in Section 2.3.2. As the OS has matured, as has its security measures.
Since Android 4.4, SELinux enforcing mode is required for all applications on all devices
[77]. SELinux is short for Security-Enhanced Linux, and enforcing mode is the strictest
mode it can use. It is a mandatory access control system built in to the Linux kernel,
providing finer granularity to access controls than the standard Linux one [78].
4.4.4 API Levels and Dependability
As described in section 2.5.2, there have been many releases of the Android platform
and different devices support different releases (known as API Levels). When designing
an Android application the developers can decide what should be the minimum API
Level required to run the application. A larger span of API Levels means more devices
can run the application. However, the trade-off is that more work is required to ensure
that the application works correctly for every API Level.
New functionality is introduced with new API Levels, leading to issues with backward-
compatibility. It is logical that if such functionality is used in applications that should
also be able to run on older platforms, there have to be fallback methods in the code to
1The IMEI number is a unique device identifier
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handle such cases. However, in isolated cases, there can also be an issue with forward-
compatibility. Almost all changes to the framework API are additive, but it is possible
that a necessary part of the API is removed in a future platform release. This could
make the application look or behave differently on a higher API Level [79].
To ensure dependability on multiple API Levels the developer should have a testing
setup that allows for testing on all API Levels that the application will be run on. The
Android SDK includes multiple platforms that can be run as Virtual Devices and used
to test application compatibility [79].
Application Manifest
Every application must have a file called AndroidManifest.xml in its root directory. This
file is the application’s manifest file, and it contains essential information about the
application that is needed by the Android system [80]. Among other things, developers
can declare what API Levels are allowed to run the application. Developers state the
minimal API Level by declaring a android:minSdkVersion and a targeted API Level with
android:targetSdkVersion2. Optionally, developers can also set a maximum API Level by
declaring a android:maxSdkVersion. Setting a maximum API Level is not recommended,
since newer API Levels by design should be fully backwards-compatible. API Levels are
declared in the manifest using the <uses-sdk> element [79].
Using the manifest it is also possible to set other restrictions on what devices can run
and install the application [80]. For instance, it is possible to declare that a device needs
to have a camera or telephony features to install the application. It is also possible
to make more specific restrictions, such as that the device needs to have a front-facing
camera. Such restrictions are declared in the manifest file using the <uses-feature>
element [81].
4.4.5 Google Analytics
We theorize that the Google Analytics Android SDK could be useful for measuring
dependability throughout the lifetime of an application. The Analytics SDK allows
tracking a wide variety of metrics in deployed applications. It allows the developer to
learn what users are using the application and in what ways. Of special interest in
the case of analyzing dependability, it is possible to collect data related to crashes and
exceptions. In case a fault avoids detection throughout the testing process and makes it
into a released product, the Analytics SDK could assist the developer in correcting the
2If no target API Level is set, android:targetSdkVersion equals android:minSdkVersion.
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fault as swiftly as possible. When users begin running the application on new hardware
and newer OS versions there may also be some unwanted behavior in the software, that
the Analytics SDK could assist the developer in detecting. Further investigation into
Google Analytics and finding proof for its potential values for dependability could be
used as a basis for future work in this field.
4.5 Result and Discussion - System Parameters
This section contains our findings regarding the system parameters and a discussion
regarding those findings.
4.5.1 Processor
The processing power of different Android devices varies significantly. There is no way
to restrict devices with a processing speed below a certain threshold from running the
application. One could argue that this should be possible using the applications manifest,
but unfortunately there is no way to set such a restriction. In an application such as
the security camera the developer has to take this into consideration. An appropriate
measure could be to adapt the resolution of the recording if the device is unable to keep
up with the requested frame rate. When the user runs the application for the first time,
the program could attempt to benchmark the system’s capabilities and then give the
user a set of recommended settings. Another option could be to fetch the recommended
settings, using the devices model number, from a database. This solution would require
more work for the developers, but arguably lead to a better user experience.
4.5.2 Storage
Smartphones have a limited storage space. High-end devices on the market today are
commonly sold with 16GB or 32GB internal storage. However, the operating system
takes up a portion of that space3, how much depends on the OS version and manufacturer
of the device. Assuming a device used as a security camera would not have many other
applications installed, and not a lot of other media stored on its internal memory, a device
with 16GB internal storage could have an available storage of about 10GB. There are
however older devices with much more limited storage capacities, as shown in Table 2.1.
Other than allowing footage to be viewed remotely, the design choice of using a cloud
service expands the storage capacity of the system. But until a file upload has been
3Android 5.0 requires roughly 4.5GB
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verified as completed, the file has to be stored on the internal memory. Keeping the files
in RAM memory is impossible due to size limitations.
The storage capacity can become a significant bottleneck during long periods without a
working network connection. All uploads would be queued and the corresponding files
saved on the internal memory. On devices with limited storage capacity the available
space could run out quickly. If possible, the application should notify the user of the
problem. If the Wi-Fi network is inaccessible but the application is connected through
mobile data, a SMS or an email could be used for this purpose.
In cases were the storage capacity was running low the application should delete the
oldest footage first. Ideally the application should be able to lower the frame rate
and recording quality in advance if connection issues arise once the remaining storage
capacity passes a specified threshold.
Another solution to the storage capacity problem would be to implement motion de-
tection and only save footage for periods where motion has been detected, and in the
vicinity of such events. Due to time constraints we were unable to implement this
feature.
Dependability Implications
We have to ensure that the data is inaccessible to other applications on the device. If not
protected, malicious users or programs could manipulate the data during the state where
it is intermittently stored on the internal memory. Android allows for two main methods
of storing data on the device. These are labeled Internal Storage and External Storage
[82]. External Storage may be a misleading name since it can refer to both removable
storage media (such as an SD card) or the internal (non-removable) storage. Files stored
in External Storage are world-readable, and any installed applications (with the right
permissions) can read and write files placed on the external storage. In order to maintain
confidentiality and integrity we chose to use Internal Storage for the intermittent storage.
If External Storage had been used, it would be possible for third parties to view or even
tamper with the recorded footage.
4.5.3 Power Consumption
The application designed in the case study is rather power hungry. The camera, pro-
cessor, modem and device storage are used extensively. We ran some measurements on
power consumption and came up with the numbers in Table 4.3. We ran the application
for a one hour period and averaged the current consumption reported by an internal
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sensor. It proved our suspicion that the system would be unable to run for an extended
period of time without a power supply. Battery capacities of a selection of smartphones
are available in Table 4.2. It is critical that the current consumption of the device when
running the application does not exceed the amount that the device is able to charge
from the AC adapter. In our measurements, we also ran the application for a one hour
period with the AC charger attached. In these tests, the devices received enough cur-
rent through the AC adapters to charge the battery during the test. This is shown in
the Table 4.3, the battery did not lose charge, while running the application with the
charger attached.
Device Year Capacity (mAh)
Sony Xperia Z2 2014 3200
Samsung Galaxy S5 2014 2800
Sony Xperia Z1 2013 3000
LG Nexus 4 2012 2100
Samsung Galaxy SII 2011 1650
Sony Ericsson Xperia Arc 2011 1500
Apple iPhone 4 2010 1420
Table 4.2: Sample of battery capacities of mobile devices
Device Average Discharge (mA) Average Charge (mA)
Without Charger With Charger
Sony Xperia Z2 427 711
Table 4.3: Average power consumption during an hour of running the application
(while connected through WiFi, with screen turned off)
4.5.4 Network
One major advantage for smartphones over traditional security cameras is that a smart-
phone can establish a network connection both through Wi-Fi and mobile data. The
traditional security cameras we found could only connect by ethernet (wired connection)
or Wi-Fi.
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The user should be able to configure whether to upload footage while on a mobile
connection. This could be a desired feature in case mobile data is limited to a certain
amount monthly.
Dependability Implications
In case there are connection issues on the wireless home network having a mobile data
connection can be very useful. Further, a perpetrator might compromise the integrity
of the network by disabling the router or cutting the wires. If the Wi-Fi connection fails
the device could fall back to using mobile data. Detected changes in network state could
also trigger a change into a more vigilant system state. Further, the user should be able
to receive notifications of any such changes.
Normally, Android devices can only use either a Wi-Fi or mobile data connection at any
given time. If the device is connected to a wireless network that lacks connection to the
Internet this could become problematic. Our investigations found that instead of trying
to connect through mobile data, the device will then stay on the wireless network, leading
to it not having a working Internet connection. To counter this in the security camera
application, we introduced a connection test. If the connection was unable to connect
to the Internet the application could force the device to disable the Wi-Fi connection,
allowing it to attempt connecting through mobile data instead.
We found that uploads from the device to Google Drive uses HTTPS with TLS encryp-
tion. Encrypting the transferred data protects its integrity and helps ensure confiden-
tiality.
A planned feature not yet implemented in the current prototype is remote control of the
camera application by use of a web server. When implementing this feature it will be
critical to ensure that proper encryption of the network traffic is used. Further, password
protection must be used to ensure that control of the system will only be available to
authorized users. If this is not implemented correctly, a user with malicious intent may
be able to disable the security camera remotely.
4.5.5 Camera
A central part of a security camera system is the actual camera. During the development
of the security camera application we have had to consider what requirements should
be put on the camera hardware. The camera hardware in smartphones have changed
considerably over the years. Table 4.4 contains a sample of the specifications of the
camera in several phones released in the past five years.
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Device Year Sensor Megapixels Video
Lens Max framerate at resolution
Sony Xperia Z2 2014
1/2.3” 20.7MP 2160p@30fps,
f/2.0 5248x3936 1080p@60fps, 720p@120fps
Samsung Galaxy S5 2014
1/2.6” 16MP 2160p@30fps,
f/2.2 5312x2988 1080p@60fps, 720p@120fps
Sony Xperia Z1 2013
1/2.3” 20.7MP 2160p@30fps,
f/2.0 5248x3936 1080p@60fps, 720p@120fps
LG Nexus 4 2012
1/4.0” 8MP 1080p@30fps,
f/2.4 3264x2448 720@30fps
Samsung Galaxy SII 2011
1/3.0” 8MP 1080p@30fps,
f/2.0 3264x2448 720@30fps
Apple iPhone 4 2010
1/3.2” 5MP
720p@30fps
,
f/2.0 2592x1936
Table 4.4: Sample of specifications of phone cameras
Focus
It is important that the subject matter is in focus in the recorded frames. This allows
people to be more easily identifiable. The typical camera in mobile phones has a wide
depth of field, allowing both near and far objects to be in focus. We found by sampling
phone camera specifications that an aperture of f/2.0, f/2.2 and f/2.44 was the most
common (as seen in Table 4.4). Having a smaller aperture leads to a wider depth of field
[83]. Figure 4.3 shows an example of the opposite, a narrow depth of field. The contents
of the photograph are sharp at the point of focus, contents nearer or further away from
the camera appear blurry. The amount of blurriness increases with the distance from
the focal point.
Having a wide depth of field means that both subjects close to, and far away from the
camera can be resolved with acceptable sharpness [83]. This is useful in our case study
where we want to capture a scene and justifiably resolve both near and distant objects
and subjects. Another term used in photography is hyperfocal distance. If you focus a
lens at its hyperfocal distance, everything in the resulting photograph from some near
distance to infinity will be sharp. In landscape photography, the hyperfocal distance is
often used, leading to both near objects and objects in the background being resolved
sharply.
4These are actually f-stop numbers, having a smaller f-stop number leads to a a larger aperture, and
a narrower depth of field
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Figure 4.3: A narrow depth of field
The hyperfocal distance is the point of focus where everything from half that
distance to infinity falls within the depth of field
John Shaw’s Landscape Photography, John Shaw, 1994 [84]
Allowing the camera to use auto-focus was not acceptable. In our trials auto-focus led
to the camera struggling to get the focus right in difficult lighting conditions, rendering
much of the scene out of focus. Instead we found that fixing the focus at infinity allowed
the whole scene to be captured in a reliable manner. Very near objects were resolved
slightly blurry, but with enough sharpness to be identifiable.
Resolution
The resolution of an image or of each frame composing a video5 will have a significant
impact on the file size. As discussed in Section 4.5, the system has a limited amount of
storage space. We decided to give the user a choice between VGA (640x480) or HD 720
(1280x720) depending on their preferences and the capabilities of the device. It would be
possible to extend the collection with a smaller resolution, such as QVGA (320x240), for
devices with severely limited hardware. However, in our opinion, the resulting footage
would be of such poor quality that it would be difficult to distinguish subjects, which
would negatively impact the system’s dependability.
5For videos, the ultimately deciding factor for the file size is actually the bitrate of the video
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Frames Per Second
In the application designed in the case study, series of images will be stitched together
into a video file. The interval between each image captured is an important factor. If
the interval is too great, there is a risk that the camera fails to capture something of
interest. But there is a trade-off, as the interval gets shorter, more frames are captured
leading to larger amount of data to process.
Processing more data will require the processor to run more, requiring more energy from
the battery. The amount of data to be uploaded will also be increased putting more
strain on the modem which also will result in a higher energy usage. For the application
we decided to use one frame per second as the standard option. We felt that this was
often enough to capture the changes of the scene in most conditions. Further, we added
the option to change this to one frame every other second or to two frames per second.
A planned future feature is adaptive, content based, frame rate. The amount of frames
per second could change automatically depending on the system state. Basic image
analysis could be used to determine if the recorded scene was completely stationary for
an extended period of time. If such a state was detected the frame rate could be changed
to one frame every other second. In case motion in the scene was detected the frame
rate could be increased to two frames per second. Further, using Androids face detection
API, if a face was detected the frame rate could be increased to 15 or perhaps even 30
frames per second. A lower frame rate when recording static scenes would reduce energy
consumption, network load and intermittent storage requirements. A higher frame rate
during scenes with motion or even detected faces would increase the odds of successfully
identifying any possible perpetrators.
Bitrate
Tying the resolution and FPS together with overall quality is the bitrate of the video.
The bitrate is the number of bits used for the data contained in a given time period of
the file. In this report we will use kbps, that is thousands of bits per second, as the unit
for bitrate.
To maintain high quality video while minimizing video size it is important to calculate an
optimal bitrate. To achieve this we found a tool called Video Bitrate Calculator available
online [85]. Using this tool we found that an optimal bitrate for a MPEG-4 video
(H.264 AVC codec) at VGA resolution (640x480), with one frame per second, consisting
of mostly still images, is 52.22kbps. For HD resolution (1280x720) the corresponding
bitrate is 158.67kbps. This can be compared with the bitrate of videos recorded with an
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Xperia Z2 smartphone with default settings, which is 3720kbps for VGA and 12251kbps
for HD video. We verified that our calculated bitrates were high enough by recording
different scenes and then checking that the video quality was good enough to see moving
objects in the recorded scenes clearly. Table 4.5 shows the calculated optimal values and
those used by the default camera of the Xperia Z2.
We also found that a video with HD resolution would look better than one at VGA
resolution, given the same bitrate. However, we wish to state that all observations
regarding video quality are subjective and that the best design choice would be to
include a few different quality settings, and let the user decide which one to use. Ideally,
the software would also be able to detect network quality and disk usage and use this
information to adapt the settings accordingly.
Resolution Bitrate FPS Normalized bitrate
(kbps) (kbps at 1 FPS)
Sony Xperia Z2 HD (720p) 12251.00 30 408.37
Calculated optimal HD (720p) 158.67 1 158.67
Sony Xperia Z2 VGA 3720.00 30 124.00
Calculated optimal VGA 52.22 1 52.22
Table 4.5: Result of bitrate calculations
Multiple Cameras
In the last few years, the majority of Android smartphones released have been equipped
with two cameras. The rear-facing camera is in general of higher quality than the front-
facing one. In the current version of the system we use only the rear-facing camera
since the resulting footage is of a higher quality. However, a future feature that could
be added is using both cameras. This could for instance be used when mounting the
camera in the middle of a corridor, giving nearly complete coverage of the corridor with
just one camera.

Chapter 5
Conclusions
In this chapter we will repeat the research questions we defined in Section 1.2.1 and give
a short summary of our findings:
RQ1 What are the challenges when implementing an Android application with require-
ments on high dependability?
Throughout our thesis work we have found several challenges with implementing de-
pendable applications for Android. Somewhat counter-intuitively, one major challenge
when implementing an Android application is the versatility of the operating system.
Android runs on many different kinds of devices, with a wide range of performance
levels. When designing a system for Android it is difficult to know how much of the
hardware that the system will be using. The processor’s computing power, amount of
RAM memory and storage space can vary significantly as illustrated in Table 2.1. The
service interface may be as different as a two inch touchscreen and a 70 inch television,
controlled by remote control. This is a major difference compared to when designing a
system where you know exactly, or at least have good estimates of, what the hardware
is throughout the design and implementation phases.
Fortunately Android allows developers to supply flexible user interfaces that adapt to
support different screen configurations and device types. As discussed in Section 4.4.4 it
is possible to decide what system version, and what features are required to install and
run the application. Ensuring a high level of dependability is arguably more challenging
when targeting a broader range of devices running different versions of the operating
system.
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RQ2 What design patterns can aid in the design and development of dependable appli-
cations on the Android platform?
The time constraints made it impossible to look into many different design patterns and
compare their usefulness. As described in Section 4.2, we utilized Rapid Application
Development in the development process. We found that it was a useful technique in
a project with a short time-span such as this. Time pressure meant we were unable to
sit down ahead and research the optimal way of solving every issue. Instead, we learned
from our experiences and adapted the requirements and functionality throughout the
development process. We found that RAD worked well in a project of this nature.
We found that as the application grew in complexity, it became increasingly challenging
to ensure a high level of dependability. For example, features that had seemed ideally
implemented in previous iterations could require significant changes to co-exist with
a newly added feature. To counteract this, ideally, each component of the application
should be decoupled from the other components. In loosely coupled applications, changes
in one component will cause little or no effect to the other components. The concept
of decoupling was outlined in Section 2.4.5, and how it was applied to the case study is
described in Section 4.2.
RQ3 What challenges arise when designing a dependable software system for a multi-
purpose operating system such as Android?
– What are the main differences compared to when designing a software system
running on specially designed hardware, tailored to its designated task?
– How does the difference in performance between different devices impact the
dependability of the running software?
When designing dependable software on the Android platform compared to on a single-
purpose system with designated hardware, another major difference is introduced; the
hardware components will be shared with several other running processes. The sharing
of resources makes it difficult to predict device performance. It also raises security
concerns. It will not matter if the application you designed is highly dependable, if
another application on the device, that is beyond the control of the developer, causes the
system to crash. These are some of the differences we found with developing dependable
systems for Android compared to the purpose-built systems described in RQ4. As
mentioned in Section 5 below, future work attempting to uncover and prove more explicit
differences could be carried out.
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Finally, we found that the system has to be able to adapt to the performance of the
hardware it is running on. In the security camera described in our case study this is
accomplished through adaptive recording settings. If the processor is too slow to produce
the desired output, the recording quality should be lowered to accommodate for this.
Case-Study Summary
All things considered, we are pleased with what we accomplished with the case-study.
We managed to create a working prototype of a security camera application with all
the planned features in place. The application was verified to have acceptable power
consumption. The quality of the recordings was good and the quality settings could be
changed to adapt to different hardware. We found that the case-study worked well as a
method for collecting information related to dependability of systems, both in general
and those running on the Android platform.
Future Work
During the work on this master thesis time constraints have hindered us from going as
in-depth into every field as we would have liked to. A more detailed investigation could
be carried out in how to ensure and analyze dependability. A study could be carried
out, attempting to make a more detailed comparison on how to implement an identi-
cal software system on Android, and on a single-purpose platform with task-designed
hardware.
As discussed in Section 4.4.5, further investigation into Google Analytics and its effects
on dependability could provide valuable results in this research field.
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Genom en fallstudie lyckades vi urskilja ett antal viktiga punkter att minnas vid utveck-
ling av system med höga krav på tillförlitlighet. Dessa lärdomar förväntas vara nyttiga för 
utvecklare av mjukvara till Android, men bör även kunna tillämpas på andra plattformar.
Android är ett operativsystem för mobiltelefoner. I vår 
forskning har vi försökt komma underfund med hur man 
kan utveckla tillförlitliga system till Android. Vi upptäckte 
att det fanns en avsaknad av information om utveckling 
sådana system till Android och vi ville råda bot på den bris-
ten. Ett tillförlitligt system är ett system som kan garanteras 
utföra sin uppgift på ett korrekt sett. Vi bestämde oss för 
att göra en fallstudie för att försöka ta reda på viktiga punk-
ter för utvecklare att tänka på när de utvecklar till Android. 
Fallstudie: Övervakningskamera
Som fallstudie valde vi att utveckla en nätverksupp-
kopplad övervakningskamera. En övervakningskamera 
kan beroende på tillämpningsområde anses vara ett sys-
tem med höga krav på tillförlitlighet. Systemet består 
av en applikation, det underliggande operativsystemet 
samt en molntjänst. Exempel på molntjänster är Drop-
box och Google Drive. De möjliggör lagring av data ”i 
molnet”, det innebär att data är lagrad på servrar och 
kan kommas åt från användarens olika enheter. I fallet 
av övervakningskameran är den lagrade data det inspe-
lade materialet.
Resultat
Vi kom bland annat fram till att en 
stor utmaning när man utvecklar för 
Android är att det är ett så mångsidigt 
operativsystem. Operativsystemet kan 
köras på en mängd olika former av en-
heter med stor varians på enheternas 
prestanda. Android kan nämligen för-
utom mobiltelefoner köras på bland 
annat surfplattor, smarta klockor och 
smarta TV-apparater. Det är svårt att veta vilka funktio-
ner samt vilken prestanda enheterna som systemet körs 
på i slutändan faktiskt kommer ha. Det är en stor skill-
nad för användaren om den styr systemet med hjälp av 
en 4 tums pekskärm eller att gränssnittet ritas upp på en 
70 tums TV och styrs med en tillhörande fjärrkontroll. 
Detta utgör en stor skillnad mot mer traditionell utveck-
ling där man vet mer om vilken hårdvara som systemet 
kommer köras på tidigt i design och utvecklingsfaserna.
 För att underlätta kan utvecklare införa vissa restrik-
tioner för vilka enheter som tillåts köra applikationen. 
Man kan till exempel ställa krav på att enheten har en 
kamera, vilket i fallet av vår fallstudie är avgörande för 
funktionaliteten. Man kan även ställa krav på hur ny 
version av Android som enheten måste ha installerad. 
Eftersom ny funktionalitet införs med varje ny version 
av operativsystemet så är det lättare för utvecklaren att 
garantera enhetligt beteende om det tillåtna spannet av 
Android-versioner är smalare. Android tillåter även flexi-
bla användargränsnitt, vilket är viktigt för utvecklaren 
att utnyttja om applikationen kan tänkas köra på många 
olika typer av enheter och med många 
olika skärmstorlekar. Vi kom även 
fram till att det är viktigt att applika-
tionen kan anpassa sig efter enhetens 
prestanda. I fallet av vår applikation 
innebar det att minska kvalitén på 
inspelningen på långsammare enhe-
ter. I det stora hela så kom vi fram till 
en hel del viktiga punkter att tänka 
på vid utveckling, och vi fann att en 
fallstudie var ett bra arbetssätt för att 
komma fram till dem.
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